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(summary) 
The importance of  preferential tariff arrangements 
As the leading entity in world trade, the Community puts this economic advantage to use 
in  its  external  policies  of which  preferential  tariff arrangements  are  one  of the  main 
implementing instruments. 
These  arrangements  have  been  gathering  more  momentum  in  successive  stages 
(association of the Western-European countries, development-aid,  pre-accession strategy 
for  the CEECs,  Mediterranean policy,  increasing trade with Asian  countries),  and  now 
involve very significant volumes of trade. From being the exception, they have, in many 
cases,  become  the  rule,  and  they  play  an  important  part in  the  Community's  external 
policies and in dealings by traders. 
A global set of  problems 
Even if the discrepancies in applying the arrangements are essentially customs problems, 
the Commission considers that they should be seen in a wider political context. 
The requirement for clarifying the conditions for applying the arrangements implies taking 
their  objectives  into  account  : furthering  the  development  of the beneficiary  countries 
(particularly, in the light of the Singapore Conference), promoting cooperation between 
partner-countries, preparing the integration of  candidates for accession. 
Political advantage for the Community as a whole 
The European Parliament is  greatly  concerned  by  two  essential  characteristics  of this 
problem: the fight against fraud, and the Community's external policy on development. 
Due to the discovery of these discrepancies,  the Council decided,  on 28  May  1996,  to 
request the Commission to initiate, in particular, a study of  the conditions for the recovery 
of  the customs duties which are due. 
To,be effective, the study requested should reconcile two non-conflicting aims: 
- the simplification of  formalities in trade 
- the fight against the fraudulent use of  the arrangements, so that the tariff preferences are 
granted only to the designated beneficiaries. 
Strength~ning ofthe preferential arrangements through analysis oftheir discrepancies 
The actual Communication should be composed of two parts : firstly,  a detailed analysis 
of the discrepancies; secondly,  as  a result of this analysis,  proposals aiming  at  reforming 
the conditions of  application. 
d.  - 3 The players in preferential tariff arrangements 
The players in preferential tariff arrangements are often reponsible for such a situation, but 
they are also a victim of  it. 
- Community traders : they use these arrangements to their benefit, but they are also the 
first to be affected by the discrepancies,  especially the importers who are liable for  the 
customs debt.  In this respect, there exists a legal  precedent which weighs the importers 
down with the burden of"commercial risk" whenever they use the arrangements; 
- Customs authorities of  the Member States : they are the main  ones reponsible for the 
application of  the arrangements, in that they are called upon to detect fraud and violations, 
and to recover unpaid duties; 
-Authorities in the beneficiary countries : they are reponsible for issuing certificates of 
origin; 
- Producers and exporters in third countries : it is they who have to ask for the issue of 
certificates of  origin from the authorities in third countries. 
The answers to be provided 
For the provision of  the answers, it will be necessary, amongst other things : 
- to settle previous cases OJ} the basis of the regulations existing at the time that the facts 
were  established,  in  conformity  with  the  legal  precedent  setting  out  that  faith  in  the 
certificate of  origin is not normally protected, but constitutes a  "normal commercial risk"; 
- to restore confidence in the arrangements, particularly by making sure that the Member 
States, first and foremost responsible in the application of them, attain this in an uniform 
and harmonized manner; 
- to make all  of the players in  the arrangements aware of their responsibilities,  in  their 
common interest, so that they assume their obligations on this question and to put them in 
a position to do so; 
- to legislate, whenever it becomes necessary. Table of  Contents 
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7 l.  Introduction 
In compliance with the provisions of  Article I 52 of  the Treaty, the Council requested 
the  Commission  (Decision  No  96/C  170/01  of 28  May  1996,  on  post-clearance 
recovery of customs debt1)  to carry out a study with a view  to  finding  an  overall 
solution to  various  problems  which  have  arisen  in  the  application  of preferential 
customs arrangements, especially the problems of recovery; in part, the problems of 
recovery  stem from  irregularities,  committed  by  the  authorities  of the beneficiary 
countries, which Community traders cannot reasonably ,<ietect, 
While  satisfying  the  Council's  request,  the  Commission,  already  aware  of the 
necessity,  considers  that  other  aspects  in  the  application  of preferential  tariff 
arrangements  should  also  be  examined,  wherever  there  are  numerous 
discrepancies. Solutions  to be  provided  for  these  discrepancies  should  be  sought, 
while bearing in  mind  the Community's commitments on the issue of development-
aid, the necessity for cementing economic relations with its partners, compliance with 
customs regulations,  and  respect for the legitimate interests of traders and  those of 
the Community budget. 
1.1  Preferential tariff  arrangements: the Community at the heart of  the largest set of 
preferential trade agreements and arrangements 
The Community is unquestionably the most-accessible market in the world, and it is 
largely through the openness of its trade policy that it has been able to carve itself a 
major political role on the world-stage. 
The Community has  contracted  agreements with,  or granted  tariff preferences  to, 
almost two hundred  countries and  territories.  In  fact,  every country in  the world, 
with  the  exception  of the  United  States,  Japan  and  a  few  others,  benefits  from 
preferential  tariff  arrangements  with  the  Community  (  cf.  Annex  I).  Product-
coverage,  as  well  as  the  preferential  margin  relative  to  the  MFN-duties  ('\nest-
favoured nation" clause), varies from one system to another.  Current estimates show 
that about half of the goods coming into the Community do so within the scope of 
one of  these systems. 
Correspondingly,  the customs unions,  to which the  Community  is  party,  also  fall 
~thin  this set of  problems. 
1.2  Numerous discrepancies in implementing preferential tariff  arrangements 
The  Commission  is  regularly  informed,  by  its  own departments  for  investigation 
and/or control, by the Court of Auditors or by  the Member States, of discrepancies 
in the preferential tariff arrangements. For some time now, the Commission has been 
working  with  the  Member  States  to  monitor  the  situation  and  to  identify  the 
problems  which  arise  in  applying  the  arrangements.  It  has  emerged  that  these 
discrepancies  result from  the  way  in  which  the various participants (authorities and 
traders, in the beneficiary countries and  in the Community) apply or do not apply the 
arrangements, as well as from a certain lack oflegislation. 
OJNoC 170ofl4.6.l996,p. l. 
8 As  will  be  seen  later,  the  commercial  advantage,  obtained  by  the  misuse  of the 
preferential system (in particular, through non-observance of  the rulesof origin), is at 
the very root of the problem of these discrepancies. Besides the negative effect on 
the tariff (granting preferential customs duties unduly),  this unfair advantage has a 
perverse effect  on  commercial  policy,  including those  aspects which  are the  most 
sensitive  for  the Community's  economy (circumvention of anti-dumping  measures 
and of-quantitative quotas). 
Investigations,  carried  out by  the  Community  in  the  beneficiary  countries,  have 
shown that the suspicions of fraud are well-founded, with the irregularities detected 
often representing 70- 100% of  the imports which are checked. The table in  Annex 
II gives an overall picture ofthe damage caused by such behaviour. 
Such fraud is  politically and economically intolerable and threatens the pursuit of 
the aims of  these arrangements, the competitiveness and the survival of Community 
industry, and fair trade.  Furthermore, it undermines the legitimate confidence which 
traders should have in  the  arrangements; it also  creates a considerable loss  for  the 
Community's own resources. 
Given  the  scale  of the  problem,  the  Commission  decided  to  carry  out  a  general 
overview, the findings of  which are the subject of  this communication. 
1.3  The purpose of  this Communication 
This  Communication,  therefore,  sets  out to  analyse  the  discrepancies  which  have 
occurred in the application of  these arrangements, in relation to the objectives which 
they are supposed to attain. 
Such  an  analysis  should  cover  the  causes  and  the  consequences  of  these 
discrepancies,  for  the  Community,  as  well  as  for  the  beneficiary  countries,  the 
economic  openr:ors  and  the  Community's  own resources,  in  order to  be  able  to 
propose appropriate solutions, with the following two-fold aim in mind: 
to  make  the  arrangements  more  effective  by  reminding  the  various  parties, 
involved  in  implementing  them  in  the  Community  or  in  the  beneficiary 
countries,  of their responsibilities,  without as  such overburdening exclusively 
one or other of the parties with the responsibility for the discrepancies ; 
to  guarantee  compliance  with  the  Community's  commercial  policy,  thus 
ensuring its uniform application, and with the pursuit of the aim of supporting 
the development of  its partners, notably the least-developed countries. 
2.  Preferential arrangements: raison d'etre, form and impact 
2. I  Political, historical and geographical justification 
Through  these  arrangements,  the  Community  has  been  pursuing  the  aim  of 
development-aid.  The  Lome  Convention  and  the  arrangements  for  the  Overseas 
Countries and  Territories  (OCT)  were so  negotiated.  In  the  same  way,  under  the 
aegis of the  United  Nations,  the Community runs the largest scheme of generalized 
preferences (GSP)  in  the  world,  mainly  benefiting the  countries of Asia  and  Latin-
America. 
9 The  Community  has  prepared  for  each  new  wave  of accessions,  since  the  early 
'Seventies,  by  negotiating  agreements  to  phase  in  free  trade  with  prospective 
Meml:1er  States  prior  to  full  membership. This  strategy  was  employed  with  the 
countries  of the  European  Free  Trade  Association  (EFT  A)  and,  now,  with  the 
Central  and  Eastern-European  Countries  (CEEC).  The  agreements  provide  for 
preferential tariff arrangements to be granted to  the relevant countries before they 
join the- Community. 
The Community  also  maintains  close  economic links  with  its  neighbours,  such  as 
Norway,  Iceland  (through  the  European  Economic  Area  (EEA)),  Switzerland 
(through EFT  A),  and the Mediterranean countries or those countries with which it 
has concluded a customs union (Andorra, San Marino and Turkey). 
2.2  Major political and economic impact 
Under these arrangements,  goods,  particularly manufactures,  enter the Community 
free of  customs duty or at a reduced rate of  duty. 
In  general terms, the arrangements are part of the Community's commercial  policy 
and  are  a  key  component  of its  external  policies.  They  are  thus  instrumental  in 
forging special relationships with the  Community's partners,  such as third  countries 
in the EEA. In fact, the resulting tariff preferences provide an incentive to the traders 
to get their supplies from partner-countries. In other respects, the arrangements are 
an instrument for development policy,  aiming at the speedy sale,  on the Community 
market, of products originating in  the developing countries,  and  thus to encourage 
industrialisation, investment and the processing of raw materials.  The final  objective 
of  these arrangements is to promote, gradually and ha.rm'oniously,  long-lasting social 
and economic development in these countries. 
It should be noted that,  in  its  Communication on improving  market-access for the 
least-developed  countries (COM  97/156  final,  of 16  April  1997),  the  Commission 
presented its assessment and  its goals in  opening up  the  Community market to the 
least-developed countries so  as to give them a foothold  in  the world economy.  The 
Commission has also presented a 'Green Book" on relations between the European 
Union and the ACP  countries at the dawning of the 21st century,  with the aim  of 
strengthening political and economic links with these States. 
2. 3  Preferential tariff  arrangements : two legal forms 
In  accordance with the provisions laid  down by  the bodies governing international 
trade,  preferential  tariff arrangements  may  take  one  of two  legal  forms,  each  of 
which has consequences for the way they operate. They are: 
contractual (agreement-based),  i.e.  negotiated accords, most of which are 
fully  or partially reciprocal (EEA, EFT  A,  CEEC,  Mediterranean Agreements, 
Lome Convention, customs unions); 
autonomous,  i.e.  non-negotiated  and  not  reciprocal  (OCT,  GSP,  some 
countries of former Yugoslavia). 
10 3.  Functioning of the preferential tariff arrangements 
3.1  Types of  trade cover_ed 
Trading  with  beneficiary  countries  ts  not  necessarily  carried  out  under  these 
arrangements. 
The fact that a country is  eligible for tariff preferences does not mean that all  of its 
exports are carried out in the context of  the Community's preferential arrangements. 
All  of the  preferential  agreements  and  arrangements  set  economic  and  customs 
criteria (nomenclature, customs value and,  most importantly,  rules of origin) which 
the goods must first  satisfy,  in  order to qualify  for. preferential treatment.  Products 
which are not covered by the agreements or which fail  the criteria must be charged 
the full common customs tariff (CCT) duty on entry into the Community. 
One significant point is that the arrangements are merely optional. 
3.2  Preferential rules of  origin 
Of  the criteria mentioned in item 3. 1 above, the essential one is that known as 'hlles 
of origin".  Normally, these rules are enshrined in a protocol or separate instrument, 
most commonly annexed to to the agreements or arrangements concerned. 
3. 2.1  The purpose of  preferential rules of  origin 
The aim of the preferential rules of origin is to allow only those products from 
partner-countries or from beneficiary countries to benefit from the preferences, 
without leading to a deflection of traffic which would prejudice trade with the 
Community.  In accordance with these  principles,  the rules tend to  favour an 
economic  integration  based  on  the  reciprocal  advantages  to  be  gained  in 
conventional relationships, and to contribute to the development of industry in 
the beneficiary countries by giving them the means of controlling the running 
of their own resources.  To achieve these ends, the rules of origin,  which vary 
little from  one system to another,  introduce standards for limiting  the use of 
raw materials from non-beneficiary countries, and for maintaining most of the 
processing activity in the partner-countries or beneficiary countries. 
To  meet  the  needs  of  economic  integration,  the  .rules  of  origin  are 
complemented by  provisions for 'cumulation': thereby allowing a beneficiary 
country to use goods originating in another beneficiary country and/or in  the 
Community.The  extent of the  cumulation is  adapted  to  the  desired  level  of 
integration. 
3.2.2  Basic mechanisms 
By way of  example, under the rules of  origin in the Protocols, which have been 
in force since the start of  the year, among the Community, the EFT  A countries 
and the CEECs1,  preferential treatment is granted only to those goods, coming 
from these countries, which: 
E.g., OJ N° L343 of31.12.1996 on the Europe Agreement between the EC and the Czech Republic 
11 have been wholly obtained in these countries or have undergone sufficient 
working there (the conditions are laid down,  product-by-product, and appear 
in an annex to the protocols); 
have been subject to the  levying  of customs  duties  (and  on which  such 
duties have not been reimbursed) in respect of any third-country components 
used  in  the  manufacture  of products  deemed  to  have  undergone  sufficient 
working; 
have been shipped directly to the Community; 
are  accompanied  by  a  specific  certificate  proving  that  they  satisfy  the 
relevant conditions. 
Preferential treatment is also granted to: 
goods produced using  components  from  two  partner-countries,  e.g.  the 
Community and Slovakia (bilateral cumulation); · 
goods produced using components from three or more partner-countries, 
e.g. the Community, Switzerland and Slovenia (diagonal cumulation); 
goods produced using  components  from  several  member  countries of a 
regional  group,  e.g.  Vietnam,  Indonesia  and . Singapore,  all  of which  are 
members of  ASEAN (regional cumulation); 
goods  obtained  by  successive  transformations  within  the  EEA  (total 
cumulation). 
4.  The players in preferential tariff arrangements 
4.1 Economic players 
Preferential  treatment  is  on  offer  as  an  ease-of-access  in  trading  with  certain 
countries. It is  not granted automatically and  is  dependent on the traders deciding 
what steps to take : the exporter who proposes or accepts to supply his client with a 
certificate leading to the preference, and the importer who may decide to submit it to 
the customs authorities at the time of  importation. 
4.1.1  Traders outside of  the Community 
After checking that the products satisfy the criteria to qualify for preferential 
treatment,  the  exporters  are  required  to  make  a  formal  request  to  the 
competent authorities .of the exporting country for the issue of a certificate of 
origin,  while  providing  them  with  all  of the  relevant  information.  Given  the 
financial  advantage to be obtained, the  provision or otherwise of a certificate 
of  origin is included in the calculations when the contract is negotiated with the 
Community importer (or successive contracts when there is amiddleman, agent 
or distributor involved).  · 
Once  issued,  the  certificate  of origin  is  forwarded,  by  the  exporter,  to  the 
importer, either directly or through a middleman. 
12 4.1.2 Community importers 
From  the  negotiations  described  in  item  4.1.1  above,  it  follows  that,  in 
practice; the importer knows if  the goods will be sold to him with or without a 
certificate of origin, even before any request is submitted to the authorities in 
the exporting country. 
The importer is responsible for the accuracy of all of the details in the import 
declaration (type, origin, value, quantity, application for preferential treatment, 
etc.)and is  therefore  legally  liable,  in  the  eyes  of the  administrations  of the 
Member States,  for  the  consequences of any  inexactitude  in  one or other of 
these references. 
4.1.3 Good  faith on the part of  the importer, and commercial risk 
For  obvious  commercial  and  technical  reasons  (organisation  of after  -sales 
service,  health policy,  etc.) the importer usually checks on the quality of the 
products, before signing the contract and  while it is being carried out,  which 
puts him  in  the  position of knowing the pertinent facts  as  to the originating 
status of the  products.  Such information may  be  passive  (received  from  the 
exporter) or active (when he insists that his supplier uses specific components 
or raw materials, or that he will obtain them for him). 
In  this  respect,  the  Commission  points  out  that  faith  in  the  validity  of a 
certificate of origin is not protected, this being a normal "commercial risk" as 
given by the Court of  Justice ofthe European Communities1• 
The plea of good faith can only be invoked by the importer in the event of an 
error made by the competent authorities in respect of  origin certificates, that is 
'only if it was the competent authorities themselves which created the basis for 
the  expectations'  (Judgment  of 14  May  1996  of the ECJ,  Joined  Cases C-
153/94 and C-204/94- "Faroe Seafood"). 
In  this  context,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  instances  of genuine  'good faith",  as 
regularly pleaded by  importers in an attempt to avoid  recovery of duties,  are 
not common. In these particular cases, the concept of 'commercial risk' itself 
stands in the way of the importers being released from the obligations defined 
by the Community Customs Code, 
It  is  altogether  possible,  however,  and  is  often the case,  that the importers 
include protection-clauses in  their contracts,  so  that their suppliers  are liable 
for the financial  consequences of any false  declarations of origin,  in the same 
way as they do for other elements in their transactions (quality, quantity, terms 
of delivery, etc.) 
4.2  Authorities in beneficiary countries 
Customs offices in  the Member States are not always in a position to determine, at 
the time of importation, whether the goods are eligible for  preferential treatment or 
not.  Community agreements and  regulations on preferential arrangements make the 
Case Van Gend &  Laos NV; Joined Cases 98 and 230/83; Judgment of the ECJ of 13.11.1984 
13 beneficiary countries responsible for issuing the certificates of origin, in the spirit of 
cooperation and trust. 
To this effect,  it is up to the third countries to designate the authorities responsible 
for verifYing,  at the time  of exportation,  if the goods  satisfy  all  of the conditions 
necessary for preferential treatment, prior to the issue of  the certificates requested by 
the exporters. These authorities are obliged, also, to provide the Member States with 
the relevant information (within a prescribed time-limit) to allow the latter, in case of 
doubt at the time of importation or later, to make sure that the goods can effectively 
be granted preference. 
The conditions, for the assistance to be given by the beneficiary countries, are given, 
in all of  the agreements ori preferential arrangements, under the heading 'Methods of 
administrative cooperation".  · 
4.3  Authorities in the Member States 
The  customs  authorities  in  the  Member  States  are  reponsible  for  verifying  and 
accepting import declarations,  and for  carrying  out any  controls which they deem 
necessary when goods are brought onto the customs territory of  the Community. 
These authorities  have the jurisdiction to  exercise their independent powers,  also, 
when imports are made under preferential tariff arrangements. Given the difficulty of 
verifying  the  origin  of the  goods  at  the  point  of entry,  the  authorities  have  the 
additional power of  calling on the beneficiary countries for assistance, as pointed out 
in item 4.2. 
The  authorities  of the Member  States  may  ask  the  authorities  of the  beneficiary 
countries to verify the authenticity and content of the certificates supposedly issued 
by  them,  and  to communicate all  the information necessary to  make  sure that the 
goods do indeed qualify for preferential treatment. 
In  the  event  of random  sampling  or  when  there  is  'teasonabje  doubt':  the 
information requested must be communicated, therefore, within a strict time-limit.  If 
the answer is not received within the time-limit, or if  the answer is insufficient, then it 
cannot be confirmed that the goods qualify for preferential treatment. This results in 
a refusal by the Member States to grant preferential treatment, and in the consequent 
·recovery ofthe customs dutie& due. 
If  an investigation is to be carried out, the authorities of  the Member States may give 
the  importer  the  option  of having  the  goods  cleared,  against  the  appropriate 
guarantees, if it  is  decided  not to grant preferential treatment until  the findings  are 
obtained. Practically, and  as intended by the scheme, this means that the guarantees 
to be taken should be at the level of  the full duties due, as soon as there is reasonable 
doubt. 
The  possibility  which  Member  States  have,  of  appealing  for  administrative 
cooperation,  is  therefore a decisive  element  in  the  process of verifying the  proper 
application of these arrangements. Experience shows, however, that controls, carried 
out in  this  manner,  become  much  more  effective when preceded,  accompanied  or 
followed, as necessary, by verifications and investigations carried out by the Member 
States themselves, either on their own or co-ordinated at Community level. 
14 Moreover,  since  the  infringement  of the  preferential  rules  of origin  is  a  natural 
consequence of some irregularity or fraud,  the Member States are bound to inform 
the Commission of their suspicions or their findingson this question, seeing t\:lat this 
information is  of interest to the Community,  in  accordance with the  provisions of 
Regulation (EEC) No  1468/81,  as  amended,  on mutual assistance between the the 
administrative authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter 
and  the Commision  to  ensure the correct  application  of the law  on customs  and 
agricultural matters1. 
Finally,  as recently confirmed  by  the European Court of Justice ('Faroe Seafood" 
Judgment,  mentioned  above),  the  Member  State authorities  may  proceed with  the 
recovery  of duties  when  a  Community  fact-finding  mission  concludes  that  the 
disputed goods do not qualifY for preferential treatment. 
Administrative  cooperation  is,  therefore,  a  vital  factor  for  the  arrangements  to 
function properly,  but its effectiveness depends on the authorities of the beneficiary 
countries and of  the Member States making use of  its provisions to the full. 
5.  Discrepancies in the application of  preferential tariff  arrangements 
Despite the existence of an  instrument for  administrative cooperation with partner-
countries, much improved upon and extended in re-p.egotiated agreements and  in the 
introduction of the new GSP scheme, it must be admitted that the discrepancies are 
numerous and are becoming worse, with the result that ·goods which are not eligible 
are benefiting in correctly from preferential treatment. 
Preferential  treatment  can  be  obtained  incorrectly  by  using  the  wrong  tariff 
classification for the goods, or by giving a false indication of the customs value, or, 
as  is  becoming more common, by the traders concerned not abiding by the rules of 
origin. 
In the  main,  discrepancies  are  detected  through inquiries  or fact-finding  missions, 
whether they are co-ordinated at Community level or carried out within the Member 
States  (for  example,  textile  products  from  Bangladesh);  given  their  widespread 
nature, they can be identified by the the variety of  problems created. 
Investigations · are  focused  on  imports  of those  products  which  are  the  most 
susceptible to  fraud,  and  have  shown that  discrepancies  are likely  to  appear under 
any of the arrangements and that there is not necessarily a direct correlation between 
the standard of administrative infrastructure and the type of  fraud. 
5.1  Types of  irregularity or fraud in preferential origin 
From analysis of the cases so far recorded, several types of irregularity or fraud can 
be identified,  as  described below.  Needless to say,  the irregularities or in~tances of 
fraud which are the most difficult to detect are those which are most rampant. 
certificates which are irregular as  to form (incomplete,  not signed and/or not 
stamped by  the official authorities),  certificates which are authentic but which 
OJ No Ll44, 2.6.1981, as amended in OJ  No L90, 2.4.1987. 
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or arrangements, false or falsified certificates. 
There is generally little difficulty in detecting such cases. 
certificates which are authentic but which have been issued for goods which 
have  not  been  obtained  in  the  beneficiary  country.  The  detection  of such 
irregularities, made possible through administrative cooperation, may require a 
delicate approach if  there is complicity between the authorities, responsible for 
the issue or control of  the certificates, and the fraudsters; 
certificates which are authentic but which  have been issued  for goods which 
have been obtained in  the beneficiary country without respecting thj;:  rules  of 
origin - these are,  by  far,  the most common (for example,  orange-juice from 
Israel). 
The implementation of administrative  co-operation plays  an  important  part  in  the 
detection  of  irregularities,  but  is  no  substitute  for  the  investigation  of 
traders' operations which should, in any case, be carried out by the Member States. 
5.2  Products concerned 
No category of products is  untouched by such discrepancies,  but investigations,  in 
general  reflection  of the  specialisation  of the  export-industries  in  those  countries 
benefiting from arrangements, concentrate on the most-sensitive products, the ones 
which  are  the most  attractive to traders for  the  purposes  of fraud  (for  example, 
televisions from Turkey). 
The tables in Annex II contain instances of  fraud and the effective levels of  recovery. 
The  extent  of the  problem,  and  the  most-sensitive  products,  can  be  identified 
therefrom, as well as an assessment of  the negative impact, on the proper functioning 
of  these arrangements taken as a whole, resulting from not capitalizing on the results 
obtained. 
5. 3  Responsibilities of  the traders and of  the authorities in case of  discrepancies 
5. 3.1  Traders outside of  the Community 
The rules of origin are conceived in such a way as  to give the traders every 
opportunity to know whether the products they manufacture are in accordance 
or not. Moreover, the traders usually manufacture a limited range of products, 
often subject to such rules, for the same market.  Investigations show that it is 
not  usual  to  fmd  an  importer who is  really  not  aware of the rules  of origin. 
Nevertheless, some problems have arisen concerning the interpretation of  these 
rules, such as confusion among the various preferential arrangements: 
In providing Community importers with a certificate of origin for goods which 
do  not qualify, these traders give them with the means of eluding payment of 
the customs duties normally due.  When they negotiate the sale of the goods, 
they  are  aware  that  the  provision  of a  certificate  of origin  is  a  definite 
advantage to the importer. 
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certificates  of origin  by  simply  concealing  the  real  status  of the  products. 
During investigations, some traders have exerted pressure on the authorities in 
an attempt to delay or influence the issue. 
5.3. 2]raders inside of  the Community 
Since they are responsible for the accuracy of the declarations they make to 
customs authorities, importers are presumed to know the rules of  origin, in the 
same way that they should know the tariff nomenclature and  other customs 
regulations. 
The fact that a certificate of origin is presented with the import declaration - a 
deliberate act on the part of the importer - makes the importer liable for any 
duties not paid at the time of importation, as has already been stated earlier by 
the Commission. 
In awareness of this, it is up to the importer to take the necessary precautions, 
in  order to meet his  responsibilities,  especially at the time  of negotiating the 
contract.  Even  before  concluding  a  commercial  contract,  for  example,  the 
importer  can  also  apply  to  customs  authofities  in  the  Community  for  an 
evaluation of the origin of his  product, by  means  of the new 'binding origin 
information" procedure.  Apart  from  the fact  that  this  instrument  gives  him 
some guarantee for  his  commercial operation, it could also  be an  element of 
proof in  determining  his  good faith  in  the  case  of a  dispute  at  the  time  of 
clearance through customs1. 
Investigations show that a de facto solidarity can  develop between traders in 
beneficiary countries, which have been subjected to an  inquiry,  and  traders in 
the Community, in view of  their common interest in protecting and maintaining 
trade  relations  in  an  environment .  made  favourable  by  the  possibility  of 
preferential treatment.  This  solidarity  is  often  practised jointly,  especially  to 
put pressure on the authorities in  the  bene~ciary countries,  in  an attempt to 
avoid the foreseeable consequences of  an inspection or to cancel its effects. 
5. 3. 3 Authorities of  the beneficiary countries 
Investigations show that the most significant fraud detected over the past few 
years  concerns  goods  imported  from  countries  at  very  different  stages  of 
development (for example,  fabric  from  the Maldives,  shrimps from the  Faroe 
Islands).  It  stems  from  a  disregard  for  the  provisions  for  administrative 
cooperation, and from frailties in the administrative structure. 
5. 3. 4  Authorities of  the Member States 
Though aware that the provisions for administrative cooperation are enforced 
to  very  different  extents  by  the  beneficiary  countries  and  that,  therefore, 
recourse to them  is  very  uncertain,  the  Member  States too  often  persist  in · 
Regulations (EC) No 82/97 of 19.12.1996 (OJ No L 17, 21.1.1997, p.1) and No 12/97 of 18.12.1996 
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of  investigation and recovery. 
The  safeguard  measures,  which  should  come  into  operation  when  checks 
become  necessary,  especially  in  cases  of  reasonable  doubt,  are  not 
implemented in the same way by aJI Member States. This favours the deflection 
of trade, complicates the issue of recovery of duties in  the case of a -positive 
result, and leads to the unequal treatment of  traders. 
in  spite  of the  Commission's  attempts  at  co-ordination,  the  fmdings  of 
Community fact-finding missions are not used to their full  extent.  This paves 
the way for dubious imports without involving any great risk for traders. 
Another problem  arises when Member States claim that the certificates  have 
not been invalidated by the third country,  as  a reason for  not recovering duty 
after some irregularity has been found.  Such grounds are provided for by  the 
regulations,  and  are  not,  therefore,  an  acceptable  excuse.  Case  law  in  the 
Community has constantly confirmed that the decisive criterion for recovery is 
ineligibility. 
By adopting such course of action, the Member States, artificially and  without 
any  legal  justification,  are  transferring  their own  responsibility  onto  the 
authorities in the beneficiary countries. 
5. 4  The importers' grounds for complaint 
Community importers also  complain often about these discrepancies which occur in 
the arrangements, especiiilly since actions for recovery can come into operation two 
or three years after the importation has taken place. 
However,  it  has  been found,  in  many  instances of investigation,  that  importers arc 
usually  informed  that  their  operations  are being  investigated,  either  in  the  initial 
stages by the Member State, or by the exporters when it is underway. In this context, 
they are aware of the results of the verification, even before the results  have been 
communicated  to  the  requesting  authorities,  but  they  do  not  always  make  the 
necessary arrangements to put their house in order, despite the time available before 
the procedures for recovery can come into being.  In so doing, they contribute to the 
continuance of the negative effects  of the discrepancies,  to  the detriment of those 
i_mporters who abide by the rules, and of  Community producers. 
5. 5  Discrepancies in the particular context of  developing countries 
Awareness of these discrepancies and  the responsibilities of traders and  authorities 
alike in the matter does not exonerate the .Community from examining the underlying 
causes of such a situation, especially in  so far as development policy is concerned. It 
has  to  be  pointed out,  in  this  respect,  that the  partner beneficiary  countries do  not 
find  themselves  on  the  same  footing  vis-a-vis  Community  rules.  Many_ of them, 
especially those coming from  the  emergin~ economies  in  Asia,  have certainly been 
able  to  avail  themselves  considerably  of the  advantages  offered  to  them  by  the 
Community,  and  have  been  able,  in  accordance with the objectives of the rules of 
origin,  to  intensify  their  industrialisation-process  by  integrating  their  production-
network  from  top  to  bottom,  with  the  aid  of internal  and  external  investment, 
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countries,  especially the least-developed  ones (LLDCs)  and  those  having  a similar 
level of development (sub-Saharan Mrica, insular states), which have not been able 
to take full advantage of  the substantial commercial benefits made available to them, 
because of their economic, institutional, administrative or financial  structures wh,ich  . 
often  do  not  allow  them  to  start  up  an  industrial  process:  Because  of these 
weaknesses,  some of these  countries  are  trying  to  develop  an  industrial  basis  by 
concentrating  an  intensive  labour-force  on  the  activity  of  '1ast  working  or 
processing':  which does not always  meet the requirements for  the rules  of origin. 
The  Commission  has  recently  examined  this  problem  in  its  Communication  on 
improving access to the Community market for LLDCs. 
Steps are necessary to  confront this  situation.  On  the  one hand,  it  is  certainly  not 
conceivable that insistence on genuine controls and  abidance by the rules should 5e 
forgone,  since this would only lead to jeopardising the preferential arrangements,  to 
the detriment of their ultimate aim  of promoting development.  On  the other hand, 
however,  it  is  just as  inconceivable  to  let these countries,  which  are  amongst the 
poorest in the world, fail  to avail themselves of benefits vital to their survival.  The 
Commission  has  already  put  forward  concrete  proposals,  in  the  context  of the 
abovementioned Communication, to improve the rules of origin by simplifying them 
and  clarifYing the conditions for applying them..  The same concerns are also taken 
into consideration in the definition of the necessary actions, discussed in item 9,  for 
remedying the discrepancies of  the preferential arrangements. 
6.  Consequences of difficulties in applying preferential tariff arrangements 
6.1  Consequences on Community policies 
Political and  economic relations  with the countries  concerned  are  affected  by  this 
situation.  In  particular  these  discrepancies  have  negative  consequences  on  the 
commercial policy of  the Community, thwarting its effectiveness and endangering the 
development  and  economic ·integration  of the  beneficiary  countries  which  are 
precisely the raison d'etre of  the preferential tariff regimes. 
6.1.1  Consequences for manufacturers 
On the other hand,  the industrial  community  is  affected  by  the  distortion of 
competition  thus  created  and  complains  about  the  lack  of firmness  of the 
measures  adopted  and  of their  application.  They  emphasise  the  serious 
consequences,  in  terms of employment  and  the  closing-down of firms  in  the 
Community. 
Thus,  Community  production  faces  competitiOn  which  had  not  been 
anticipated.  The  imported  goods  benefit  not  only  from  entry  into  the 
Community  at  reduced  duties,  but  also  from  the  conditions  specified  for  a 
particular  concession  not  being  applied  (for  example,  allowing  the  use  of 
components  which  are  even  cheaper  than  those  actually  produced  in  the 
beneficiary country). In this way, the price of such products on the Community 
market  can  be  artificiallly  lowered,  and  helps  to  force  Community 
man~facturers  ofid~ntical or similar products into bankruptcy. 
19 Community  industry  is  sometimes  unwilling  to  accept  certain  concessions 
granted  to  third  countries  by  the  Community.  Industry  is  quite justified  in 
insisting that these concessions be limited to those products and countries for 
which  they  are  intended  and  and  which  meet  the  conditions  and  basic 
requirements for the arrangements. This is all the more justified when fraud in 
preferential origin circumvents commercial measures such as quotas and  anti-
dumping duties. 
Many  manufacturers  have  protested  at  this  situation,  both  to  the  Member 
States and to the Commission, and put a lot of faith in their capacity to react in 
such a way as to end this detrimental situation or, at least, to limit its negative 
effects. 
6.1.2  Consequences for importers 
Those importers who use the regimes in the proper way are facing direct unfair 
competition from  imports of products which do  not  qualify  but which  have 
been wrongly  granted  preferential  treatment. The very  economic  survival  of 
these  importers could be  seriously  threatened,  if such  unfair  competition  is 
allowed to continue. It should not be forgotten that they play a central role in 
the implementation of preferential arrangements,  arrangements which are still 
of  vital importance to a number of developing countries. 
6. 2  Economic consequences for third countries 
Given the objective of the rules of origin in relation to the preferential treatment of 
the goods, it has to be n~ted that operations which violate these rules do not give the 
exporting countries the real economic advantage intended by  the arrangements,  due 
to the fact that the value added there is non-existent or very low.  This is particularly 
obvious  when  products  are  not  manufactured  in  the  country,  but  simply  trans-
shipped there.  Even if there is  some industrial  activity involving final  processing or 
subcontracting, it is likely to be short-lived and the profit in terms of  development is 
very low, seldom involving long-term investment, transfer of technology,  or training 
of  local staff. 
However,  for some LLDCs,  it  is  true that an  industrial  activity  giving  little local 
added value often represents a godsend. The goods thus produced do not qualify for 
preference (other than in specific individual cases on the basis of an ad hoc decision 
for  derogation:  Communication  on  improved  access  to  the  Community  market, 
mentioned  above,  paragraph  1.2,  'hiles  of origin'),  and  it  is  important  that  the 
Community makes full use of the stimulant effect of  preferences in  the establishment 
of  a more complete industrial network in these countries. 
6.3  Consequences for the Member States and the Commi.ssion 
Due to the prevalence of laxity in the implementation of administrative cooperation 
and, hence, to its lack of credibility, customs departments have serious difficulties in 
making traders abide by these arrangements. 
However, on analysis, the proper application (for which the Member States alone are 
· competent) ofthe provisions for administrative cooperation and of  the conclusions of 
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the current situation and towards dissuading a number of  unscrupulous traders. 
Responsible for co-ordinating the management of  the arrangements and the activities 
of investigation and  control,  the Commission is  too often forced  to go beyond  its 
competence and  to intervene, on behalf of the Member States, with respect to  the 
beneficiary countries. 
Given !hat its powers of  action and control are somewhat limited, the Commission is . 
often not able to prevent the negative effects, on commercial policy,  on Community 
policies  and  on own resources,  of these  discrepancies  which  arise  from  the  non-
observance of  the arrangements by those participants directly involved. 
With regard to own resources, it should be noted that the revenue not collected as...a 
result of  these discrepancies has to made up in another way; to some extent, this loss 
of revenue is  balanced out and  borne by  .. the rest of the European taxpayers rather 
than by the importers who should normally have paid them. 
7.  The future of preferential tariff arrane:ements 
7.1  Preparation for enlargement, and its impact on preferential tariff  arrangements 
Pressure on these arrangements has  increased in  recent years,  due to the necessary 
extension or reinforcement of preferential measures granted to countries applying for 
membership. 
Preparation for  enlargement is  a  special  opportunity to  encourage these countries, 
both at the level of  the tt.aders and the authorities, to apply correctly the procedures 
for managing and controlling these preferences within a cooperation framework with 
the Union.  The future will be better prepared for these countries, the sooner these 
procedures are put into use. 
In so doing, by managing the arrangements, and by obtaining real mec:ns of appraisal 
to act or react according to the circumstances and in transparency, the Union will be 
able to determine the suitable conditions for a progressive transition ensuring these 
countries full participation in the Union. 
7.2  Reduced tariff  advantages for certain products 
•, 
This reduction comes from  the  general  lowering  of CCT  -duties,  as  a result of the 
conclusions of the Uruguay Round,  the  application  of which  comes  to  an  end  in 
2004. With this  general reduction in  tariff advantages,  products will attract duty of 
less than two or three per cent, and application for the preferential arrangements will 
eventually be of little interest.  Of course,  the preferential arrangements will still  be 
attractive for  sensitive products with higher duties,  such as  agricultural and fishery 
products or textile products and shoes. 
This gives an indication of the need to adapt the rules of origin to the mid'-term and 
long-term situations.  However,  for  the time being,  tariff reductions granted by  the 
Community  are  still  considerably attractive.  It is  therefore  advisable  to  define  the 
means which will enable these instruments to continue playing their role fully. 
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It could be asked whether there is a link between the amount of  discrepancies and the 
way that the preferential rules of origin are structured. In its Communication of 16 
April  97,  the Commission gave  an  initial  breakdown in  tllis  respect and  proposed 
guidelines for improving the situation, notably by targeting the more coherent use of 
derogations and the simplification of  these same rules. 
8.  Options for the Commission 
On the problem of discrepancies, the option of expanding the concept of good faith, 
thereby sheltering unscrupulous traders and penalizing the traders who abide by the 
rules of  the game, is clearly not acceptable.  The Comnlission considers that the only 
possible option is to improve the way that the arrangements work, in the interests ~f 
all  of the parties concerned.  As  for  the past,  that can be  dealt with only under the 
legislation in force at the time. 
This  option  is  fully  in  line  with  the  declaration  that  the  Comnlission  put  in  the 
Minutes ofthe Council Session of28 May 1996, an extract ofwhich is given below: 
The Commission "  ... takes due note of  the Council's request to carry out this study. 
It observes nevertheless that the  thrust of the  Council's request would lead to  the 
substantial amendment of  current regulations. 
The  Commission draws attention to  the  role,  under current law,  of  importers who, 
as pointed out by the  Commission  in  its Work Programme  (COM (96)  17)  on  the 
fight against irregularities and  fraud,  and in ·accordance with the  decisions of the 
European Court of  Justice, remain,  in principle, legally and  financially liable. 
However,  it will examine this request in a constructive manner,  and in the light (?f 
the recent decisions of  the Court,  while  bearing in mind the criteria for the smooth 
operation of Community policies and giving priority to  the  strengthening of the 
coherence of  the rules and of  the current provisions, as well as the  need to protect 
the financial interests of  the Union." 
9.  Actions necessary for remedying the discrepancies in preferential tariff 
arrangements 
Actions already taken by the Comnlission and  by the Member States should help to 
rectify  the  situation,  but  will  not  be  enough,  and  other  actions  will  have  to  be 
contemplated. 
To  a  large  extent,  such  actions  should  be  based,  in  particular  on  the  various 
programmes of work or action, for example in the customs field  ('Customs 2000') 
aimed,  amongst  other  things,  at  standardizing  and  clarifying  the  conditions  for 
applying the common commercial policy and protecting the financial interests of the 
Community. 
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9.1.1  Modernization of  the preferential rules of  origin 
At the Commission's instigation, the Community has,  for  a number of years, 
b.een overhauling, unifying and simplifying the preferential rules of  origin. This 
is  a  result  of the  explosion  in  the  number  of conventional  preferential 
agreements since the start of the decade,  and  of the need to make the rules 
tpore accessible and more transparent. 
Since I July 1997, the preferential rules of  origin applied by the Community in 
dealings with Europe (EEA,  EFT  A,  CEECs,  i.e.  more than thirty countries) 
are identical.  The same text has been proposed to tre twelve Mediterranean 
countries, and some of  them are about to accept it. 
This action of standardizing and  improving the preferential rules  of origin  is 
based,  inter  alia,  on  simplification  of the  documentation  (abolition  of the 
EUR.2  and  APR. I,  and  general  use  of invoice  declarations),  on the use of 
largely-standardised wording (for example,  for  the basic  definitions,  such as 
'wholly obtained'), or on the promotion of a new type of relation with traders 
(generalization of  the concept of"approved exporters"). 
Moreover,  where it  was  possible,  some  of these  new  rules  have  also  been 
incorporated into the ACP/OCT Conventions, as well as into the GSP. 
9.1.2 Attributing the  management of the  preferential tariff arrangements  to  the 
customs administrations of  the beneficiary countries  · 
The main task ofthe administrations ofthe Member States in this matter lies in 
checking certificates of origin and their content, both at import and at export. 
It is not a question of checking every certificate, but to carry out checks on the 
basis of risk-analysis techniques.  These administrations also  have the task of 
issuing  binding  origin  information,  which  has  been  part  of the  Community 
customs regulations since the beginning of 1997. 
Clearly,  the workload of these administrations has  increased  as  a  J,"esult,  but 
such is the price for the smooth operation of a system of preferential rules of 
origin.  Just as  the Community customs administrations take full  responsibility 
for managing the rules of  origin, so it seems essential that their counterparts in 
partner countries  do  the  same,  provided  that these  customs  administrations 
really do  have the necessary power and competence, and  especially that they 
make  real  use of them,  in  particular with regard  to  controlling traders.  This 
would allow full use of  the knowledge of  customs law, common to all customs 
administrations.  In llirge  part, the customs law is  harmonized  at international 
level (classification, value, etc.). Action in this direction is ready to be started. 
9.1. 3 Raising the awareness of  the beneficiary countries 
The first  preferential arrangements go  back to the 'Seventies.  Since then,  the 
Community has made great efforts to explain what the preferential origin rules 
mean, how they should be applied and why greater administrative cooperation 
is necessary. 
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countries  concerned,  and  then  proceed  to  training  activities  for  the  people 
responsible for managing and  applying the origin rules· in  practice.  During the 
last three years, about twenty such seminars were organized by the Community 
in various parts of  the world. 
In  addition,  the  Community  has  called  on  specialized  organizations ·to  help 
these countries gain a better grasp of the rules and  differentiate between the 
Community rules and those that these same countries have also to apply with 
respect to other donor-countries of  preferences. 
Moreover,  although it is  not  their raison d'etre,  the Community fact-finding 
missions can also have indirect teaching effects, in the same way as information 
seminars  organized  in  these  countries,  by  helping  the  local  adminstrations 
improve their knowledge as regards control. 
Lastly, since 1994, the Commission has organized regular meetings (ten or "So) 
within the framework of  the Customs Code Committee (Origin Section), open 
to  EFT  A/CEEC/Baltic  countries,  as  well  as  to  all  of the  Mediterranean 
countries. 
9.1.4  Controlling  the  practical application  of preferential  arrangements  in  the 
Community 
During recent years, several control-and-monitoring campaigns on origin have 
taken  place  in  the  Member  States,  particularly  concerning  preferential 
arrangements, in  o~der to examine all of the aspects of the application of the 
preferential rules of  origin, both on imports and on e~ports. 
These  controls,  carried  out  during  the  years  1992-199  5,  gave  rise  to  the 
observation of  various anomalies; the most serious being as follows: 
the  rules  of origin  are  not  always  interpreted  uniformly  by  the 
Member States; 
the customs of  some Member States are very decentralized; therefore, 
the overall examination of  fraud is not always carried out centrally; 
the simplified procedures allow greater flexibility for the benefit of  the 
companies, but at the same time limit the possibilities of  control by the 
customs authorities; 
it is often difficult, within the intended deadline, to obtain satisfactory 
answers to retrospective controls of the evidence  of the  origin;  this 
has  created  enormous  difficulties  for  the  collection  of outstanding 
custom duties. 
These control measures are additional to other similar  campaigns carried  out 
by  the  Commission  within  the  framework  of the  follow-up  to  the  annual 
reports of the Court of  Auditors. 
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9. 2.1  Existing mechanisms 
- The  agreements  all  contain  a  protocol  on mutual  assistance  in  customs 
matters,  applicable within the  framework  of prevention of and  fight  against 
fraud, as well as the rules of  origin contained in those agreements . 
.  - Provision for  intra-Community co-ordination and  cooperation on  customs 
matters  (mutual  assistance,  circulation  of information,  etc.)  is  made  by  a 
horizontal measure (Regulations 1468/81 and 515/97) 
- In both autonomous arrangements (GSP, former yugoslav Republics,  etc) 
and in the conventional agreements (Europe Agreements, EFT  A, etc.), there is 
a verification  procedure for  cases  of reasonable  doubt.  If there  is  no  reply 
within  10  months,  or the  reply  is  insufficient,  the  preferential  treatment  is 
refused. 
- In  the  framework  of the  GSP,  when  it  appears  that  there  has  been  an 
infringement  of  the  rules,  the  Union  has  the  possibility  to  carry  out 
investigations in collaboration with the authorities of  the beneficiary country. 
- With  regard  to  the GSP,  Regulations  3281/94  and  1256/96  (Article  9) 
provide for  the possibility of withdrawing  preferential  treatment  in  cases of 
fraud or in the absence of  administrative cooperation. 
In  convent~onal  agreements,  difficulties,  between  the  customs 
administrations  of the.  two  parties,  in  the  application  of the  verification 
procedures  are  raised  at  the  Association  Committee,  without  prejudice  to 
national provisions applicable to infractions 
9.2.2  Loopholes and missing provisions 
- With  regard  to  the  Union's  internal  situtation,  there  is  no  legally-binding 
Community instrument to  ensure that Member States do  not  apply  different 
safeguard measures, in cases of reasonable doubt, with the resulting possibility 
of  trade circumvention. 
-With regard to beneficiary countries, firstly in the framework ofthe GSP, use 
has never been made of the provisions contained in  Article 9,  in cases where 
there has been a lack of administrative cooperation, because they are onerous 
and their application is  dependent on the Member  States.  Furthermore,  there 
are no  provisions to enable the rapid  implementation,  by  the Commission,  of 
intermediate and provisional measures which could be adapted to the scale and 
specific nature of  the different situations encountered. 
- In  the  case  of other  preferential  arrangements,  again  there  are  no  legal 
provisions  enabling  the  Commission  or  the  Member  States  to  adopt 
appropriate  provisional  mesures  and  there  are  also  no  provisions  similar  to 
those contained inArticle 9 of  the GSP. 
25 Therefore: 
- In the framework of conventional agreements, no  provisions are foreseen in 
cases  where the  Association  Committee  is  unable  to  resolve  differences  of 
opinion. 
- Likewise, in this conventional context, it is  not always possible to confirm 
whether the provisions have been fully implemented in a partner country (as in 
the  case of televisions  from  Turkey),  or whether  the third-country  customs 
administrations really have the legal competence to check the originating status 
of products covered by certificates of origin which they have issued; there are 
even  cases  where  they  have  claimed  they  were  unable  to  carry  out  such 
controls (as in the case of  orange-juice from Israel). 
9.3  Actions to be taken 
Restoring confidence in the preferential tariff arrangements involves all of  the parties 
who  use  and  manage  these  arrangements,  whether  inside  the  Union  or in  third 
countries, or whether administrations or traders. 
In the first  instance,  this  step should  be  based on an  initial  reminder,  to  all  of the 
players,  of their  responsibiiities,  rights  and  obligations,  and  ori  abidance  by  the 
existing provisions, so that the situation can be rectified and sanctions can be applied 
for any violations if these obligations are not met. However, the Union should obtain 
additional instruments necessary to compensate for  the  weaknesses  iin  the current 
system. 
The Council and the Commission should cooperate closely to define the priorities for 
such actions and to agree on the time-table for carrying them out. 
The following are, essentially, the actions to be taken : 
9.3.1  Promotion of  a more rigorous application of  the existing provisions: 
by applying the rules strictly and  by not exceeding the required time-limits,  in 
the event of lack of administrative cooperation, or by requiring the invalidation 
of certificates and  by  applying stronger sanctions against states which do  not 
meet their general obligations; 
with regard to conventional agreements, by exploiting resolutely all means of 
dialogue  and all existing mechanisms  in  order to  convince  the  beneficiary 
countries  to  take  all  of the  appropriate  measures  when  discrepancies  are 
observed in the application of  these arrangements; 
by  encouraging  the  Member  States  to  make  full  use  of the  system  for 
communicating to the Commission all the irregularities observed or suspected 
by the Member States; 
by  making  sure  that  the  measures  and controls  set  up  by  the  contracting 
countries,  to which they commit themselves at the time of the signature of an 
agreement, are effective; 
26 by requiring, as far as possible, our partners to provide copies of their national 
legislation and, if  necessary, by helping them to set it up, in order to make sure 
that  they  will  be  able  to  have  the  internal  legal means  of satisfying  the 
obligations resulting  from the agreements; 
9. 3. 2  Lessening the impact of  loopholes by means of  appropriate provisions : 
by improving Community texts, through an across-the-board measure, with the 
qim of  standardizing actions taken by the Member States for the recovery of 
duty or for taking precautionary measures for duty, as a result of observations 
made,  amongst  other  things,  in  the  findings  of a  Community  fact-finding 
mission; 
by  using  systematically  an  early-warning system for importers  whenever •a 
justified doubt concerning origin is established,  so  that the plea of good faith 
cannot be invoked unduly; 
by  providing  for  the  possibility  of monitoring  actions  in  the  beneficiary 
countries by  introducing into the texts the  possibility  for  the Community to 
carry out controls in these countries regarding the implementation of  the origin 
rules provided for in the agreements; 
by  obtaining horizontal legal  powers,  making it possible to take uniform and 
rapid  action  throughout the  Community with respect to third  countries  not 
respecting  their  obligations,  in  particular  by  introducing  the  possibility  of 
adopting provisional measures (for example:  guarantee for  duties,  temporary 
withdrawal  of  preferences,  temporary  quantitative  controls,  etc.)  at  the 
initiative  of  eithe'r  the  Commission  or  the  Member  States,  subject  to 
confirmation at  a later date by  the  Council;  these  provisions  should  to  take 
account, according to the various preferential arrangements concerned, of the 
obligations resulting from the Community's international commitments; 
by  imposing responsibility on the authorities of the GSP beneficiary countries 
by effective application of the provisions of Article 9 of the GSP Regulations 
(which can lead to the total or partial suspension of  the arrangements) in the 
event  of  fraud  or  failure  with  regard  to  the  rules  for  administrative 
cooperation; 
by introducing, into the text of the preferential arrangements, the possibility of 
providing, for example, for temporary restrictive measures or the withdrawal 
of some  preferences.Such  provision  could,  if  need  be,  lead  to  the  full 
withdrawal of the arrangements,  in  proportion to the size  and  seriousness of 
the  case  concerned,  and  in  relation  to  the  Community's  international 
commitments. 
9.3.3  Strengthening the  provision.~ with .'>upplementary measures: 
by organizing, for the representatives of  the beneficiary countries, information 
actions on administrative cooperation; 
27 by  adopting,  for  national  administrations  and  operators,  a  training  and 
information  programme  in  the  various  third  countries,  as  well  as  in  the 
Member States of  the Community; 
by the regular organisation of  working meetings, within the framework of the 
Customs Code Co~ttee  enlarged to include groups of beneficiary countries 
and within the framework of  the joint customs cooperation committees, with a 
view to examining the conditions for applying these arrangements,  their future 
development and desirable improvements; 
by imposing responsibility on the traders and by personalizing their relations 
with the customs authorities; 
by including them in the distribution-list for the Explanatory Notes concerning 
preferential agreements and arrangements; 
by  drawing  up  a  handbook,  specially  for  them,  specific  to  the  various 
arrangements (ACP I CEECs I GSP I Mediterranean); 
by  making  available  to  third  countries  and  the  general  public  useful 
information (legislation,  handbooks,  binding  origin information i.ssued  in  the 
Community) on modern computer media (diskettes, CD-ROM, Internet); 
by publishing a notice in the Official Journal of  the European Communities, C-
series,  encouraging  traders  to  apply  for  binding origin  information  for  the 
goods which  they  import,  while  drawing  their attention  to the  risks  arising 
from the acceptan~e of  false certificates of  origin. 
9.3. 4 Preparing for the  future : 
by  putting into  effect the  actions  envisaged  in  the "Communication  on  the 
improvement of  Community market-access for (he  least-developed countries" 
and  in  particular,  wherever justified,  by  enacting  the  derogations  from  the 
origin rules, as provided for by current regulations; 
by encouraging the setting up of  regional-cooperation structures, in particular 
those allowing cooperation, including investment, between advanced and less 
advanced developing countries; by encouraging the use of regional cumulation 
within this framework; 
by preparing the Community reflection on world harmonization of  GSP origin 
rules, announced by the UNCT  AD as an action in the next few years; 
by  simpl~fying the system of  preferential rules of  origin to take account of the 
future context of  the world trade following the Uruguay Round; 
by  considering,  in  accordance  with  the  results  of the  above  policy  for 
encouraging  regional  cooperation,  the  future  need  for  an  exemption  as 
generalised as possible for the  least-developed countries and  countries at  a 
similar level of  development. 
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(a) List of agreements and other preferential tariff  arrnagements (1. 7.1997) 
ORIGIN 
EEA 
94/1/EEC  Council & Commission Decision of 13 December 1994 - Protocol 4 to 
(OJ L1, 03/01/94)  the EEA Agreement on rules of origin 
EEA Decision  Decision of  the EEA Council No 1/95 of 10 March 1995 on the entry 
(OJ L86, 20/4/95)  into force of the Agreement on the EEA for the Principality of 
Liechtenstein. 
EEA  Decision  Decision of  the EEA Joint Committee No 71/96 of 22 November 1996 
(OJ L21, 23/l/97)  amending Protocol 4 to the EEA Agreement, on rules of origin. 
Norway 
not yet published  Decision l/96 of  the EEC-Norway Joint Committee of20 December 
1996 amending· Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the European 
Economic Community and the Kingdom of  Norway concerning the 
definition of the concept of "originating products" and methods of  ' 
administrative cooperation. 
Iceland 
not yet published  Decision 1/96 of the EEC-Ice1and Joint Committee of 19 December 
1996 amending Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the European 
Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland concerning the 
definition of  the concept of "originating products" and methods of 
administrative cooperation 
Switr.erland 
not yet published  Decision 1/96 of  the EEC-Switzerland Joint Committee of 19 December 
1996 amending Protocol 3 to the Agreement between the European 
Economic Community and the Swiss Confederation concerning the 
definition of the concept of "originating products" and methods of 
administrative cooperation. 
Poland 
not yet published  Decision no 1/97 of the Association Council between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part and Poland of 
the other part, of 30 June 1997 amending Protocol 4 to the Europe 
agreement establishing an association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of  the one part and Poland of 
the other part 
llunf!arv 
97/230/ECSC, EC, Euratom  Decision no 3/96 of  the Association Council between the European 
(OJ L92, 7/4/97)  Communities and their Member States, of  the one part and the Republic 
of Hungary of the other part, of 28 December 1996 amending Protocol 
4 to the Europe agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of  the one part and 
the Republic of Hungarv of  the other part 
Czech Revublic 
9617 51 /Euratom, ECSC, EC  Decision no 3/96 of the Association Council between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of  the one part and the Czech 
Republic of the other part, of 29  November 1996 amending Protocol 4 
(OJ  L 343, 31/12/96)  to the Europe agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of the one part and 
the Czech Republic of  the other part 
29 Slovak Republic 
(not yet published)  Decision no 2/97 of the Association Council between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of  the one part and the Slovak 
Republic of  the other part, of 9 January 1997 amending Protocol 4 to 
the Europe agreement establishing an association between the 
European Communities and their Member States, of  the one part and 
the Slovak R~ublic  of  the other part 
Romania 
97/127/ECSC, EC, Euratom  Decision no 1/97 of the Association Council between the European 
(OJ LS4, 24/2/97)  Communities and their Member States, of  the one part and Romania of 
the other part, of 31  January 1997 amending Protocol 4 to the Europe 
agreement establishing an association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of the one part and Romania of 
the other part 
Bulg{lria  .. 
97/302/ESCS, EC, Euratom  Decision no 1/97 of  the Association Council between the European 
(OJ Ll34, 24.5.1997)  Communities and their Member States, of  the one part and the Republic 
of Bulgaria of  the other part, of 6 May 1997 amending Protocol 4 to ,the 
Europe agreement establishing an association between the European 
Communities and their Member States, of  the one pait and the Republic 
of Bulgaria of the other part. 
Latvia 
97 /268/ECSC, EC, Euratom  Decision no  1/97 of the Joint Committee between the European 
(OJ L Ill, 28.4.1997)  Communities, of the one part and the Republic of Latvia of  the other 
part, of 20 March 1997 amending Protocol 3 to the Agreement on free-
trade and trade-related matters bejween the European Community, the 
European Atomic Community and the European Coal and Steel 
Community, of the one part, and the Republic of  Latvia of  the other 
part 
Lithuania 
97/309/ECSC, EC, Euratom  Decision no  1197 of  the Joint Conunittee between the European 
(OJL 136, 27.5.1997)  Comniunities, of  the one part and the Republic of  Latvia of  the other 
part, of 25 February 1997 amending Protocol 3 to the Agreement on 
free-trade and trade-related matters between the EurOpean Community, 
the European Atomic Community 311d the European Coal and Steel 
Community, of the one part, and the Republic of Lithuania of the other 
part 
Estonia 
97/267/ECSC, EC, Euratom  Decision no 1/97 of the Joint Committee between the European 
(OJ L 111, 28.4.1997)  Communities, of  the one part and the Republic of  Estonia of  the other 
part, of  6 March 1997 amending Protocol 3 to the Agreement on free-
trade and trade-related matters between the European Community, the 
European Atomic Community and the European Coal and Steel 
Community, of the one part, and the Republic of  Estonia of  the other 
part 
Slovenia 
961752/Euratom, ECSC, EC  Council and Commission Decision of 25 November 1996 on the 
conclusion of the Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters 
(OJ L 344, 31/12/96)  between the European Community, the European Coal and Steel 
Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, of the one 
part, and the Republic of Slovenia, of the other part 
Protocol 4 concerning the definition of the concept of "originating 
products" and methods of administrative cooperation  -
Faroe Islands 
97/126/EC  Council Decision of 6 December 1996 - Protocol 3 to the Agreement 
(OJ L 53, 22/2/97)  with the Faroe Islands concerning the definition of the concept of 
"originatingJl!oducts" and methods of administrative cooperation. 
30 Ceuta and Mellila 
88/1135/EEC  Council Regulation of 7 March 1988 concerning the definitions of  the 
concept of originating product and methods of administrative 
(OJ L 114, 02/05/88)  cooperation between the EEC  Ceuta and Mellila. 
ACP 
90/0523/EEC  Council Decision of 8 October 1990 on the procedure concerning 
(OJ L 290, 30/10/90)  derogations from the origin rules set out in Protocol No 1 to the 4th 
ACP!EEC Convention. 
91/400/ECSC, EEC  Decision of  the Council and the Commission of 25 February 1991 on 
(OJ L 229  17/08/91)  the conclusion of  the Fourth ACP-EEC Convention. 
93/514/EEC  Decision 2/93 of  the ACPIEEC Customs Co-operation Committee 
derogating from the concept of "originating products" to take account 
(OJ L 242, 28/09/93)  of  the special situation of  Mauritius with regard to canned tuna. 
93/514/EEC  Decision 3/93 of  the ACPIEEC Customs Co-operation Committee 
derogating from the concept of "originating products" to take account 
{OJ L 242, 28/09/93)  of  the special situation of  Senegal with regard to canned tuna. 
94/18/EC  Decision 4/93 of  the ACPIEEC Customs Co-operation Committee 
derogating from the concept of "originating products" to take account 
(OJ L 12,  15/01194)  of  the special situation of  the Seychelles with regard to canned tuna. 
94/386/EC  Decision 1/94 of  the ACPIEEC Customs Co-operation Committee 
derogating from the concept of "originating products" to take account 
(OJ L 176, 09/07/94)  of  the special situation of  Fiji with regard to certain garments. 
94/946/EC  Decision 2/94 of  the ACPIEEC Customs Co-operation Committee  . 
modifying Decision No 4/93 derogating from the concept of 
(OJ L 371, 31/12/94)  "originating products" to take account of  the special situation of the 
Seychelles with regard to canned tuna. 
96/557/EC  Decision 1/96 of  the ACPIEEC Customs Co-operation Committee of 
02.09.1996 derogating from the concept of "originating products" to 
(OJ L 243, 24/09/1996)  take account of  the special situation of  the Kingdom of Swaziland with 
:regard to its manufacturing of  yarn (HS Code 5402.52 and 5402 62). 
96/558/EEC  Decision 2/96 of  the ACPIEEC Customs Co-operation Committee  of 
02.09.1996 derogating from the concept of "originating products" to 
(OJ L 243, 24/09/96)  take account of  the special situation of  Fiji, Mauritius and Senegal  . 
regarding the production of canned tuna and tuna loins. 
OCT 
91/0482/EEC  Council Decision of 25 July 1991 on the association of overseas 
(OJ L 263, 19/09/91)  countries and territories with the EEC. 
94/724/EC  Commission Decision of  31 October 1994 derogating from the 
definition of the concept of "originating products" to take account of 
(OJ L 288, 09/11/94)  the special situation of Montserrat with regard to goods of CN 8536 90 
10. 
95/375/EC  Commission Decision of  8 September 199 5 amending Decision 
94/724/EC derogating from the definition of the concept of 
"originating products" to take account of the special situation of 
(OJ  L 222, 20/9/95)  Montserrat with regard to connections and contact elements for wire 
and cables falling within CN 8536 90  10. 
%/529/EC  Commission Decision of 29 July 1996 derogating from the definition 
of  the concept of "originating products" to take account of the special 
(OJ L 223, 04/09/1996)  situation of Saint Pierre and Miquelon with regard to frozen fillets of 
cod of CN code 0304 20. 
Cyprus 
73/1246/EEC  Council Decision of 14 May 1973 concerning the conclusion of an 
(OJ L 133, 21/05173)  Agreement establishing an Association between EEC and the Republic 
of Cyprus. 
77/2907/EEC  Council Decision of 20 December 1977 on the conclusion of the 
Additional Protocol. to the Agreement establishing an association 
(OJ L 339, 28/12177)  between the EEC and the Republic of Cyprus. 
31 87/607/EEC  Council Decision of 21 December 1987 on the conclusion of the 
Protocol laying down the conditions and procedures for the 
implementation of  the second stage ofthe Agreement establishing an 
(OJ L 393, 31112/87)  Association between the EEC and the Republic of Cyprus and 
adapting certain provisions of  the Agreement. 
88/4264/EEC  Council Regulation of l3 December 1988 on the application of 
Decision 1/88 of  the EEC/Cyprus Association Council amending, as a 
(OJ L 378, 31/12/88)  result to the introduction of  the HS, the protocol defining "originating 
products" and administrative co-operation. 
89/2428/EEC  Council Regulation of28 July 1989 on the application of Decision No 
1/89 of  the EEC-Cyprus Association Council derogating from the 
provisions concerning the definition of  the concept of "originating 
(OJ L 230, 08/08/89)  products" laid down in the agreement establishing an association 
between the EEC and the Republic of Cyprus. 
90/3203/EEC  Council Regulation of 22 October 1990 on the application of  Decision 
4/90 of  the EEC/Cyprus Association Council again amending Articles 
6 and 17 of  the Protocol concerning the definition of the concept of 
(OJ L 307, 07/11/90)  "originating products" and methods of administrative co-operation. 
95/576/EC  Council Decision No 1/95 of  the EC-Cyprus Association Council of 22 
December 1995 derogating from the provisions concerning the 
definition of  the concept of "originating products" laid down in the 
(OJ L 326, 30/12/95)  agreement establishing an association between the EEC and the 
Republic of Cyprus. 
95/3056/EC  Council Regulation of30 October 1995 on the implementing methods 
for decision l/95 of  the EEC/Cyprus Association Council  derogating 
I  (OJ L 326  30/12/95)  from certain provisions  laid down in the Association Agreement. 
Malta 
76/939/EEC  Council Regulation of  23 April 1976 concluding the Financial 
Protocol and the Protocol laying down certain provisions relating to 
(OJ L 111, 28/04/76)  the Agreement establishing an association between the EEC and 
Malta. 
89/2229/EEC  Coun~il Regulation of 18 July 1989 on the application of the Decision 
No 1/89 of  the EEC-Malta Association Council amending, as a result 
of  the introduction of the HS, Protocol No 2 concerning the definition 
(OJ L 217, 27/07/89)  of  the concept of"  originating products" and methods of  administrative 
co-ot>_eration. 
90/2175/EEC  Council Regulation of  23 July 1990 on the application of  Decision 
2/90 of the EEC/Malta Association Council again amending Articles 6 
and 17 of the Protocol concerning the definition of the concept of 
(OJ L 198, 28/07/90)  "originating products" and methods of administrative co-operation. 
91/3451/EEC  Council Regulation of 25 November 1991 implementing the joint 
(OJ L 327, 29/1111/91)  declaration attached to Decision 1/89 of the EEC/Malta Association 
Council. 
91/607/EEC  Decision No l/91 of the EEC-Malta Association Council of 25 
November 1991  amending Annex III of Protocol No 2 concerning the 
(OJ L 331, 03/12/91)  definition of  the concept of "originating products" and methods of 
administrative co-operation. 
Israel 
96/206/ECSC, EC  Decision of  the Council and the Commission of 22 December 1995 on 
the conclusion of an Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related 
matters between the European Community and the European Coal and 
OJ. L  71, 20/03/96)  Steel Community, of the one part and the State of Israel on the other 
part 
Protocol No 3 concerning the definition of  the concept of  ·~riginating 
products" and methods of administrative cooperation 
32 Alaeria 
7812210/EEC  Council Regulation of 26 September 1978 concerning the conclusion 
of  the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic 
(OJ L 263, 27/09178)  Community and the People' s Democratic Republic of  Algeria 
Protocol No 2 concerning the definition of  the concept of "originating 
products" and methods of  administrative cooperation 
E!!VTJt 
78/2213/CEE  Council Regulation of 26 September 1978 on the conclusion of the 
Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic Community 
(OJ L 266, 2"ii09/78)  and the Arab Republic of  Egypt 
Protocol No 2  concerning the definition of  the concept of "originating 
products" and methods of  administrative cooperation 
89/3171/EEC  Council Regulation of 16 October 1989 on the application of  Decision 
No 1/89 of  the EEC- Egypt Cooperation Council amending, as a 
consequence of  the introduction of  the harmonised system, Protocol ·• 
No 2 concerning the definition of  the concept of "originating 
(OrL3IO  26/10/89)  Jlroducts" and methods of  administrative cooperation 
(OJ L3 10, 2611 0/89)  Decision No 1/89  of  the EEC - Egypt Cooperation Council, of 30  , 
August 1989,  amending, as a consequence of the introduction of  the 
harmonized system, Protocol No 2 concerning the definition of the 
concept of "originating products" and methods of administrative 
cooperation 
89/3172/EEC  Council Regulation of 16 October 1989 on the application of  Decision 
No 2/89 of the EEC - Egypt Cooperation Council amending, on 
account of the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European 
Communities, the Protocol concerning the definition of  the concept of 
(OJ L310, 26/10/89)  "originating products " and methods of administrative cooperation 
Decision No 2/89 of  the EEC- Egypt Cooperation Council, of30 
August 1989, amending, on account of the accession of  Spain and 
:Portugal to the European Communities, the Protocol concerning the 
(OJ L310, 26/10/89)  definition of  the concept of "originating.  products" and methods of 
admi-nistrative cooperation 
Lebanon 
7812214/EEC ·  Council Regulation of 26 September 1978 concerning the conclusion 
of  the_ Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic 
(OJ L267, 27/0978)  Community and the Lebanese Republic 
Protocol No 2  concerning the definition of  the concept of "originating 
products" and methods of administrative cooperation 
80/2742/EEC  Council Regulation of 27 October 1980 on the application of 
EEC-Lebanon Cooperation Council Decision No 3/80 amending the 
Protocol on the defiitition of  the concept of originating products and 
methods of administrative cooperation to the Cooperation Agreement 
(OJ. L286, 29/10/80)  between the European Economic Community and the Lebanese 
Republic 
Decision 3/80  Decision No 3/80 of the EEC-Lebanon Cooperation Council amending 
the Protocol on the definition of  the concept of originating products 
(OJ L286, 29/l0/80)  and methods of administrative cooperation to the Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the 
Lebanese Republic 
Marocco 
78/2211/EEC  Council Regulation of 26 September 1978 concerning the conclusion 
of the Cooperation Agreement between the European Eco~omic 
Community and the Kingdom of Morocco 
- Protocol No 2  concerning the definition of the concept of "originating 
products" and methods of administrative cooperation 
(OJ L 264  27/09178) 
33 Svriu 
78/2216/EEC  Council Regulation of 26 September 1978 concerning the conclusion 
of  the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Syrian Arab Republic 
Protocol No 2  concerning the definition of  the concept of "originating 
products" and methods of  administrative cooperation 
(OJ L269, 27/09/78) 
Tunisia 
78/2212/EEC  Council Regulation of  26 September 1978 concerning the conclusion 
of  the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic 
Community and the Republic of  Tunisia 
Protocol No 2  concerning the definition of  the concept of "originating 
products" and methods of  administrative cooperation 
(OJ L265  2709/78) 
79/0561/EEC  Council Regulation of  5 March 1979 on the application of  -. 
EEC-Tunisia Cooperation Council Decision No 3178 amending the 
Protocol on the definition of  the concept of originating products and 
methods of  administrative cooperation to the Cooperation Agreement 
(OJ. L80, 31/03179)  between the European Economic Community and the Republic of 
Tunisia 
OJL80, 31.03.79  Decision No 3/78 of  the EEC-Tunisia Cooperation Council amending 
the Protocol on the definition of  the concept of originating products 
and methods of administrative cooperation to the Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Economic Community and the 
Republic of  Tunisia 
89/3900/EEC  Council  Regulation  of  4 December 1989  on the application of 
Decision No 2/89 of  the EEC-Tunisia Cooperation Council amending, 
on account of  the accession of  Spain and Portugal to the European 
Communities, the Protocol concerning the definition of  the concept of 
(OJ. L375, 23/12/89)  ~'originating products" and methods of administrative cooperation 
Decision No 2/89 ofthe EEC-Tunisia C()operation Council amending, 
on aci:ount of  the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European 
Communities, the Protocol concerning the definition of  the concept of 
(OJ L 375, 23/12/89)  "originating products" and methods of administrative cooperation 
Jordan 
78/2215/EEC  Council Regulation of 26 September 1978 concerning the conclusion 
of  the Cooperation Agreement between the European Economic 
(OJ L 268, 27/09178)  Community and the Hashemite Kingdom of  Jordan 
Protocol No 2  concerning the definition of the concept of "originating 
products" and methods of administrative cooperation 
91/3579/EEC  Council Regulation of 25 November 1991 on the application of 
Decision No 3/91 of  the EEC-Jordan Cooperation Council amending, 
as a consequence of  the introduction of the harmonized system, 
(OJ. L345, 14/12/91)  Protocol 2 concerning the definition of the concept of originating 
products  and methods of administrative cooperation 
Decision No 3/91  of  the EEC-Jordan Cooperation Council amending, 
as a consequence of  the introduction of the harmonized system, 
Protocol 2 concerning the definition of the concept of  originating 
(OJ L 345, 14/12/91)  products and methods of administrative cooperation 
91/3 5  80/EEC  Council Reb'Ulation of25 November 1991 on the application of 
Decision No 4/91 of  the EEC-Jordan Cooperation Council amending, 
on account of the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European 
Communities, the Protocol concerning the definition of the-concept of 
(OJ. L345, 14/12/91)  originating products and methods of administrative cooperation 
Decision No 4/91  of the EEC-Jordan Cooperation Council amending, 
on account of  the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European 
Communities, the Protocol concerning the definition of  the concept of 
(OJ.  L345, 14/12/91)  originatin_g_JJ_roducts and methods of  administrative cooperation 
34 Palestine 
not yet published  Council Decision concerning the conclusion of an interim Association 
Agreement on trade and cooperation between the EC and the Palestine 
Authority 
GSP 
93/2454/EEC  Commission Regulation of  2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the 
implementation of  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2  913/92 establishing 
(OJ L 253, llfl0/93)  the Community Customs Code (Articles 67 to 97 relating to the 
definition of  the concept of "originating products" and methods of 
administrative cooperation applicable to the importation into the 
Modified by:  Community of  products originating in the developing countries 
97/12/EC 
(OJ L 9  13/1/97) 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and  .. 
Croatia; Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia; Former Yugoslav 
Republic of  Macedonia 
93/2454/EEC  Commission Regulation of 2 July 1993 laying down provisions for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing 
the Community Customs Code (Articles 98 to 123  relating to the 
(OJ L 253, 11110/93 )  definition of the concept of "originating products" and methods of 
administrative cooperation applicable to the importation into the 
Community of  products originating in the Republics of  Bosnia-
Modified by:  Herzegovin and Croatia; Federativ Republic of  Yugoslavia; Former 
97/12/EC  Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia and Territories of  the West Bank 
(OJ L 9, 13/1/97)  and the Gaza Str!P 
35 (b) List of customs unions to which the Community is party 
Turkey 
641732/EEC  Council Decision of 23 December 1963 concerning the conclusion of 
(OJ L 217, 29/12/64)  an agreement establishing an Association between the EEC and Turkey 
Reg 2760/72  Council Decision of 23 November 1970 on the conclusion of the 
Additional Protocol to the Agreement establishing an association 
between the EEC and Turkey 
Decision No 4/72 of  the Association Council on the definition of the 
(OJ L 59, 5/3/72)  concept of  "originating products" from Turkey for implementation of 
Chapter I of Annex No 6 of  the Additional Protocol to the Ankara 
Agreement 
Decision No 1175 of  the Association Council amending Decision No·· 
(OJ L 142, 4/6175)  4/72 of  the Association Council on the definition of  the concept of 
"originating products" from Turkey for implementation of Chapter I of 
Annex No 6 of  the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement  •. 
96/142/EEC  Decision No 1/95 of  the Association Council EC-Turkey on 
(OJ L 35, 13/2/96)  implementing the final phase of  the Customs Union 
96/488/EEC  Decision No 1/96 of  the EC-Turkey Customs Cooperation Committee of 
(OJ L 200, 9.8.1996)  20 May 1996 laying down detailed rules for the application of Decision 
No 1/95 ofthe EC-Turkey_Association 
96/528/ECSC  Commission Decision of 29 February 1996 on the conclusion of  an 
Agreement between the European Coal and Steel Community and the 
Republic of  Turkey on trade in products covered by the Treaty 
(OJ L 227, 07/09/96)  establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
Protocol I on rules of origin 
Andorra 
90/0680/EEC  ~ouncil Decision of  26 November 1990 concerning the conclusion of 
(OJ L 374, 3 1112/90)  an agreement between the EEC and Andorra. 
Appendix concerning the definition of  'originating products' and 
methods of  administrative cooperation 
92/116/EEC  Decision no 7/91 of  the Joint Committee of 31  December 1991 
(OJ L 43,  19/2/92)  deroga~ing from the definition of originating products to take account of 
the particular situation of the Principality of Andorra in the field of its 
production of  certain agricultural goods 
91/3915/EEC  Council Regulation of 19 December 1991 laying down rules for the 
application of Decision 7/91 of  the EEC/Andorra Joint Committee to 
(OJ L 372, 31/12/91)  allow for derogation from origin rules in certain agricultural_goods. 
95/502/EC  Decision no 2/95 of  the Joint Committee of6 November 1995 
(OJ L 288, 1/12/95)  derogating from the definition of originating products to take account of 
the special situation affecting cattle farming in the Principality of 
Andorra 
96/465/EC  Decision no 3/96 of  the Joint Committee modifying Decision no 7/91 of 
(OJ L 192, 2/8/96)  the Joint Committee of 31  December 1991 derogating from the 
definition of  originating products to take account of  the particular 
situation of the Principality of Andorra in the field of its production of 
certain agricultural goods 
San Marino 
92/561/EEC  Council Decision of 27 November 1992 concerning the conclusion of 
(OJ L 359, 9112/92)  an interim agreement on trade and customs union between_}he EEC 
and the republic of San Marino. 
36 (c) Internal measures 
Internal measures 
83/3351/EEC  Council Regulation of 14 November 1993 on the procedure to 
facilitate the issue of  certificates EUR 1 and the making out of forms 
(OJ L 339, 05/12/83)  EUR 2 under the provisions covering preferential trade between the 
EEC and certain countries. 
91/1911/EEC  Council Regulation of 26 June 1991 concerning the application of  l  I<OJ  L171  29/06/91)  Community provisions to the Canary Islands. 
37 ANNEXll 
l. Number of cases and financial impact 
The reports produced by the Commission on the fight against fraud and irregularities for 
the years 199 5 and 1996 include numerous cases which illustrate this problem. A number 
of  general aspects must however be mentioned : 
Cases of  irregularity and fraud involving the preferential regimes have an impact on the 
Communities' traditional own resources. These cases are either dealt with by the Member 
States and must then be communicated to the Commission on the basis of Regulatiotl no 
1552/89 or dealt with by the Commission in cooperation with the Member States (mutual 
assistance on the basis of  Regulations nos 1468/81 and 515/97). Given that these 
irregularities offen involve several Member States and that the investigations regularly 
require on the spot inspections in a  non member country, it is the cases which have a 
higher budgetary impact which are in general dealt with by the Commission in cooperadon 
with the Member States. 
During the period 1989 to 1995, the Member States communicated 796 cases of 
irregularity affecting traditional own resources and involving the preferential regimes. The 
overall budgetary impact for these cases alone was ecu 111  million. 
For the year 1995, the Member States communicated to the Commission 322 cases of 
irregularity involving the preferential regimes. The overal budgetary impact of  these cases 
was ecu 52.6 million. Tlus corresponds to 18% of  all the cases of  irregularity 
communicated in the area of  OY-~n resources (see graph I). (As communications in this area 
are made on a 6 monthly basis, the full figures for 1996 are not yet available). 
In  I  996 the Commission handled, in cooperation with the Member States in the 
framework of  mutual assistance, 391  cases involving the preferential regimes. For these 
cases alone the estimated global impact on traditional own resources (customs duties and 
anti-dumping duties) was ecu 220 million2. This amount corresponds to 49% of  the 
estimated total number of  cases of  irregularity handled by the Commission in  1996 in the 
framework of  mutual assistance (see graph II) and to 47% ofthe estimated total number 
of  cases involving traditional own resources handled in 1996 by the Commission (see 
graph I). 
Of  course, these figures only indicate cases of  irregularity actually detected either by a 
Member State (and notified to the Commission), or by the Comrnission. It is therefore 
only the visible part of  the iceberg. 
New cases or new investigations 
2  Almost  half of this  amount  (104  Mecu)  concerns  duties  which  have  been  formally  ident~(ied 
and are therefore recoverable. 
38 This is all the more so since the Member States do not fully cpmply with their obligations 
which should provide a full picture of  the situation regarqing detected cases of 
irr·egularity. However, the obligations for the Member States to inform the Commission 
on the position regarding recovery procedures in progress were strengthened  with the 
most recent amendment of  Regulation 1552/89 1.  But, up to now, the Member States 
have not informed the Commission on a systematic basis if  their recovery efforts have 
been successful. Experience and practice show however that the rate of  recovery by 
Member States remains low and is only about 10%. 
2. Products concerned 
Cases of  irregularity involving preferential regimes concern the following products : 
a)  Cases communicated by the Member States in 1995 (see graph III): 
. agricultural products : 
. fishery products 
. electronic products : 
. textile products : 
. other industrial products : 
Number of  cases 
20 
30 
97 
94 
81 
Budgetary impact 
15% 
17% 
32% 
24% 
12% 
100% 
b)  Cases handeled by the Commission in 1996 in cooperation with the Member States 
(see paragraph 4) : 
. agricultural products  2  8% 
. fishery products  3  26% 
. electronic products :  7  6% 
. textile products :  iS  34% 
. other industrial products :  7  26% 
Regulation no 1255/96. 
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